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Abstract:   
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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the use of global materials has in-
creased 8-fold (Krausmann et al., 2009). This increase in world demand
ranges from natural resources such as ﬁsh to energy-related resources. See
Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix A. Moreover, there is a lot of heterogeneity
about the growth rates for demand of natural resources. For instance, the
annual ﬁsh consumption growth rate for the years 1999-2013 is only 1.06% for
the US, but 3.43% for China. Similarly, for total primary energy consump-
tion, the annual growth rate for the years 2006-2013 is negative for the US
(−0.44%), but positive for both India (5.14%) and China (7.16%). Figures 3
and 4 in Appendix A further illustrate this heterogeneity of demand growth
among countries for both ﬁsh and primary energy consumption. In view
of such heterogeneity with the particular case of China’s exploding demand
for resources, it is important to understand how the anticipation of growing
demand aﬀects extraction.
In this paper, we study the eﬀect of heterogeneous growth in demand on
extraction. To that end, we extend the Great Fish War framework (Levhari
and Mirman, 1980) to a situation in which demand for the resource grows
exogenously and heterogeneously.1 Speciﬁcally, we consider the case of two
countries with heterogeneous growth in demand. The growth in demand
is assumed exogenous in order to identify clearly the eﬀect of growing de-
mand on behavior, thereby abstracting from the eﬀect of natural resource
utilization on demand growth.
We consider both non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. Under non-
cooperation, a higher growth rate in demand for one country leads to lower
extraction whereas a higher growth rate in demand from rivalrous countries
leads to higher extraction. The presence of cooperation alters this result.
The results change from the non-cooperative case. Speciﬁcally, under coop-
eration, a higher growth from any of the countries leads systematically to
lower extraction of the resources for both countries. The presence of hetero-
1See Long (2011) for an exhaustive survey of models of dynamic games in the exploita-
tion of renewable and exhaustible resources. None considers exogenous growth in demand
with the possibility of heterogeneity in the growth rates, as in our paper.
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geneous growth in demand increases the tragedy of commons because the
anticipation of higher future demand from rivalrous countries induces each
country to increase present extraction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model. Section 3 provides both non-cooperative and cooperative solutions,
which are then analyzed in Section 4.
2 The Model
Consider the Great Fish War (Levhari and Mirman, 1980) dynamic game
in which two countries derive utility from the utilization of a common-pool
resource. Let yt be the stock of the resource at time t. In the absence of
extraction, the stock evolves according to the following rule,
yt+1 = y
α
t (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1]. From (1), the evolution of the stock applies to both renew-
able resources (i.e., α ∈ (0, 1)) and depletable resources (i.e., α = 1).
At time t, for i = 1, 2, country i utilizes qi,t units of the stock. Using (1),
the evolution of the stock under exploitation is given by
yt+1 = (yt − q1,t − q2,t)α (2)
where a total of q1,t+q2,t is utilized at time t. For country i at time t, utilizing
qi,t yields utility ui(qi,t) = gi,t ln qi,t where gi,t > 0 reﬂects country i’s present
level of demand.2
In order to study the eﬀect of exogenous and heterogeneous growth in
demand on behavior, we assume that the demand parameter evolves over
time. For i = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2, . . .,
gi,t+1 = λigi,t + θi (3)
2In Levhari and Mirman (1980), gi,t = 1 for all i and t.
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where λi ∈ [0, 1) and θi > 0 are country-speciﬁc parameters. Given the initial
value gi,0 > 0,
3 the complete solution to (3) is
gi,t = λ
t
i
(
gi,0 − θi
1− λi
)
+
θi
1− λi (4)
and the system converges asymptotically to the steady state
gi =
θi
1− λi > 0. (5)
Hence, from (5), the diﬀerence in demand between the two countries con-
verges asymptotically to
∣∣∣ θ11−λ1 − θ21−λ2
∣∣∣.
3 Non-cooperative vs. cooperation solutions
In this section, we ﬁrst characterize the non-cooperative solution, i.e., the
feedback-Nash equilibrium. We then provide the solution when the two coun-
tries cooperate.
Deﬁnition 3.1 states the feedback-Nash equilibrium in the inﬁnite-horizon
case.4 To simplify notation, we drop the subscript t, and use instead a
hat sign to mark the evolution over time. Speciﬁcally, gi and gˆi represent
the level of demand today and tomorrow, respectively. Analogously, y and
yˆ = (y− q1 − q2)α are stock today and tomorrow, respectively. Let δ ∈ (0, 1)
be the discount factor. The superscript N stands for Non-cooperation.
3The restrictions on λi ∈ [0, 1) and θi > 0 ensure that, for any gi,0 > 0, the system
converges asymptotically to a positive steady state. If λi = 1, then the system explodes
since gi,t = gi,0 + tθi and θi > 0.
4The conjecture can be inferred by solving the problem recursively as done in Levhari
and Mirman (1980). By solving recursively, one realizes that the value function is always
linear in ln y. Moreover, the limit of the solution for the t-period game as t goes to inﬁnity
is the solution to the inﬁnite-horizon game that we consider.
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Definition 3.1. The tuple {QN1 (y, g1, g2), QN2 (y, g2, g1)} is a feedback-Nash
equilibrium if
1. For i, j = 1, 2, i = j, given QNj (y, gi, gj),
QNi (y, gi, gj) = arg max
qi
{gi ln qi
+δV Ni
(
(y − qi −QNj (y, gi, gj))α, λigi + θi, λjgj + θj
)}
(6)
such that qi ∈ (0, y −QNj (y, gj, gi)) and where, for any {y′, g′i, g′j},
V Ni (y
′, g′i, g
′
j) = gi lnQ
N
i (y
′, g′i, g
′
j)
+ δV Ni ((y
′ −Q1(y′, g′1, g′2)−Q2(y′, g′2, g′1))α, λig′i + θi, λjg′j + θj).
(7)
Proposition 3.2 presents the non-cooperative solution.
Proposition 3.2. There exists a unique feedback-Nash equilibrium. In equi-
librium, for i, j = 1, 2, i = j,
QNi (y, gi, gj) =
gi/A
N
i
gi/ANi + gj/A
N
j + αδ
y (8)
where
ANi ≡
λigi +
θi
1−αδ
1− αδλi . (9)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 3.3. In the non-cooperative steady state,
Q
N
i (y
N , gi, gj) =
1− αδ
2− αδy
N . (10)
where yN is the stock value in the non-cooperative steady state, i.e.,
yN =
αδA
N
1 A
N
2
g2A
N
1 + αδA
N
1 A
N
2 + g1A
N
2
(11)
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and A
N
2 is A
N
2 evaluated at steady state.
Having characterized the non-cooperative solution, we now turn to the
case of cooperation. When countries cooperate, individual extractions is
chosen so as to maximize the sum of present and future discounted utilities,
i.e., {QC1 (y, g1, g2), QC2 (y, g2, g1)} are the optimal solutions consistent with
the Bellman equation
V C(y, g1, g2) = max
q1,q2∈(0,y)
{g1 ln q1 + g2 ln q2
+ δV C((y − q1 − q2)α, λ1g1 + θ1, λ2g2 + θ2)}. (12)
Here, the superscript C stands for Cooperation.
Proposition 3.4 characterizes the cooperative solution.
Proposition 3.4. From (12), for i, j = 1, 2, i = j,
QCi (y, gi, gj) =
gi/A
C
g1+g2
AC
+ αδ
y (13)
where
AC ≡ λ1g1 +
θ1
1−αδ
1− αδλ1 +
λ2g2 +
θ2
1−αδ
1− αδλ2 . (14)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 3.5. In the cooperative steady state,
Q
C
i (y
C , gi, gj) =
gi (1− αδ)
gi + gj
yC . (15)
where g1, g2 are given by (5) and y
C is the cooperative steady state stock, i.e.,
yC =
αδA
C
g1 + g2 + αδA
C
(16)
and A
C
is given by (14) and evaluated at steady state.
From Propositions 3.2 and 3.4, it follows that non-cooperation induces
both countries to extract more than cooperation, which yields a lower level
7
of the resource stock in the steady state. Remark 3.6 restates the tragedy of
the commons in the context of heterogeneous growth in demand.
Remark 3.6. From (8) and (13),
QC1 (y, g1, g2) +Q
C
2 (y, g2, g1) ≤ QN1 (y, g1, g2) +QN2 (y, g2, g1). (17)
4 Discussion
In this section, we study how noon-cooperation aﬀects behavior in the pres-
ence of heterogeneous growth in demand. We begin by considering the inter-
mediate case in which the level of demand is diﬀerent across the two coun-
tries, i.e., g1 = g2, but without growth in demand. Proposition 4.1 states
that in the presence of diﬀerences in demand, non-cooperation distorts the
allocation of the resource between the two countries in favor of the smaller
country. Speciﬁcally, the cooperative solution allocates more resource toward
the largest country whereas in the non-cooperative solution, each country ex-
tracts the same amount each period, regardless of size of demand.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that λi = 1 and θi = 0. Then,
1. Under cooperation, for i = 1, 2,
QCi (y, g1, g2) =
gi (1− αδ)
gi + gj
y. (18)
2. Under non-cooperation, for i = 1, 2,
QNi (y, gi, gj) =
1− αδ
2− αδy. (19)
Proof. Evaluating (13) and (8) at λi = 1 and θi = 0 yields (18) and (19),
respectively.
Having considered the intermediate case of heterogeneity in demand with
no growth, we now study how the non-cooperative solution compares to the
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cooperative solution when there is heterogeneous growth in demand. Propo-
sition 4.2 states that in the presence of heterogeneous growth in demand,
similar to the case of no growth, the cooperative solution considers higher
extraction level for the country with larger present-demand size, i.e., larger
gi. However, unlike the no-growth case, under non-cooperation, countries
with heterogeneous growth in demand extract unequally. Nevertheless, the
allocation of the resource between the two countries is distorted in a diﬀer-
ent way. Indeed, under non-cooperation, countries take account of growing
demand (i.e., the terms ANi and A
N
j ) for their current consumption decisions.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that λi ∈ [0, 1) and θi > 0. Then,
1. Under cooperation, from (13) and (14), QCi (y, g1, g2) > Q
C
j (y, g1, g2)
if and only if gi > gj .
2. Under non-cooperation, from (8) and (9), QNi (y, g1, g2) > Q
N
j (y, g1, g2)
if and only if
gi
ANi
>
gj
ANj
. (20)
Proposition 4.3 provides the eﬀect of an increase in the size of demand on
the cooperative and the non-cooperative solutions. Consider ﬁrst an increase
in the current demand of one country (part (a)). Under cooperation, such
change increases extraction for the growing country, but reduces extraction of
the other country. However, under non-cooperation, both countries increase
their resource extraction. Consider next an increase in the future demand
one country (part (b)). Under cooperation, each country reduces present
extraction to preserve the stock of resources for the future enlarged demand.
Under non-cooperation, the country whose future demand size has increased,
cuts current resource extraction. However, the other country increases ex-
traction in anticipation to lower availability in future. Hence, heterogeneity
in demand growth has an eﬀect in over-exploitation of the resources and the
tragedy of the commons. The reason is that, under non-cooperation, coun-
tries’ competition to extract resources is exacerbated when they anticipate
higher future demand from their competitor.
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Proposition 4.3. For i, j = 1, 2, i = j,
1. Under cooperation, from (13) and (14),
(a)
∂QCi (y,gi,gj)
∂gi
> 0,
∂QCj (y,gi,gj)
∂gi
< 0,
(b)
∂QCi (y,gi,gj)
∂gˆi
< 0,
∂QCj (y,gi,gj)
∂gˆi
< 0.
2. Under non-cooperation, from (8) and (9),
(a)
∂QNi (y,gi,gj)
∂gi
> 0,
∂QNj (y,gi,gj)
∂gi
> 0,
(b)
∂QNi (y,gi,gj)
∂gˆi
< 0,
∂QNj (y,gi,gj)
∂gˆi
> 0.
In order to understand better the distortion resulting from non-cooperation
pointed out in Proposition 4.3, we can consider each country’s share of extrac-
tion. Let rCi and r
N
i be country i’s share of extraction under cooperation and
non-cooperation, respectively. Hence, from (13) and (8), for i, j = 1, 2, i = j,
rCi =
QCi (y, gi, gj)
QC1 (y, gi, gj) +Q
C
2 (y, gi, gj)
=
gi
gi + gj
, (21)
rNi =
QNi (y, gi, gj)
QN1 (y, gi, gj) +Q
N
2 (y, gi, gj)
=
giA
N
j
giA
N
j + gjA
N
i
. (22)
As it is presented in part 1.a of Remark 4.4, under cooperation, an in-
crease in the demand size of a country increases his own share of extraction,
and thus reduces the other country’s share of extraction. These eﬀects hold
under non-cooperation as well (part 2.a). In other words, even though part
2.a of Proposition 4.3 states that, under non-cooperation, in response to an
increase in the demand size of country i, country j increases its extraction,
its share decreases due to the greater increase in the demand size of its ri-
val, i.e., country i. Under the cooperative solution, an increase in the future
demand size of a country does not aﬀect the countries extractions shares to-
day. However, under non-cooperation, the share of the country whose future
demand size has increased will decrease due to the strategic reaction of its
rival (parts (1-b) and (2- b) of Remark 4.4).
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Remark 4.4. For i, j = 1, 2, i = j,
1. Under cooperation, from (21)
(a)
∂rCi
∂gi
> 0,
∂rCj
∂gi
< 0,
(b)
∂rCi
∂gˆi
= 0,
∂rCj
∂gˆi
= 0.
2. Under non-cooperation, from 22
(a)
∂rNi
∂gi
> 0,
∂rNj
∂gi
< 0,
(b)
∂rNi
∂gˆi
< 0,
∂rNj
∂gˆi
> 0.
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Figure 1: World Fish Consumption. Source: OECD/FAO (2013),“OECD-FAO
Agricultural Outlook: Highlights 2013,” OECD Agriculture Statistics (database).
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Figure 2: World Total Primary Energy Consumption. Source:
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA); International Energy Statis-
tics database (as of November 2012); and International Energy Agency, “Bal-
ances of OECD and Non-OECD Statistics” (2012).
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Figure 3: Fish Consumption by Country. Source: OECD/FAO (2013),
“OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook: Highlights 2013,” OECD Agriculture Statis-
tics (database).
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Figure 4: Total Primary Energy Consumption by Country. Source:
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA); International Energy Statis-
tics database (as of November 2012); and International Energy Agency, “Bal-
ances of OECD and Non-OECD Statistics” (2012).
15
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We conjecture that country i’s value function
has the form,
V Ni (y, gi, gj) = (X
N
i gi + Y
N
i ) ln y + ϕ
N
i (gi, gj). (23)
Plugging (23) into the objective function of (6) yields the dynamic maxi-
mization problem
max
qi
{gi ln qi + δ(Ai ln(y − q1 − q2)α + ϕNi (gˆi, gˆj)} (24)
where ANi = X
N
i gˆi + Y
N
i . For i, j = 1, 2, i = j, given qj = QNj (y, gj, gi),
country i’s ﬁrst-order condition is
gi
qi
=
αδANi
y − qi −QNj (y, gj, gi)
, (25)
which yields QNi (y, gi, gj) = ω
N
i y where
ωNi =
gi/A
N
i
gi/A
N
i + gj/A
N
j + αδ
. (26)
Plugging QNi (y, gi, gj) = ω
N
i y, A
N
i = X
N
i gˆi + Y
N
i , and (23) into the
objective function of (24) yields the value function
V Ni (y, gi, gj) = gi lnω
N
i + gi ln y + δα(X
N
i gˆi + Y
N
i ) ln(1− ωNi − ωNj ))
+ δα(XNi gˆi + Y
N
i ) ln y + ϕ
N
i (gˆi, gˆj), (27)
which needs to agree with the conjecture as deﬁned by (23), i.e.,
XNi gi + Y
N
i = gi + δα
(
XNi (λigi + θi) + Y
N
i
)
(28)
and
ϕNi (gi, gj) = gi lnω
N
i + δα
(
XNi gˆi + Y
N
i
)
ln(1−ωNi −ωNj )+ δϕNi (gˆi, gˆj). (29)
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Given that αδλi < 1, equation (28) implies that
XNi =
1
1− αδλi , (30)
Y Ni =
αδθi
1− αδ
1
1− αδλi , (31)
which, using (26) and the fact that ANi = X
N
i gˆi + Y
N
i , yields (8) and (9).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We conjecture that the cooperative value
function has the form,
V C(y, g1, g2) =
(
XC1 g1 +X
C
2 g2 + Y
C
)
ln y + ϕC(g1, g2). (32)
Plugging (23) into (12) yields
V C(y, g1, g2) = max
0<q1,q2<y
{g1 ln q1 + g2 ln q2
+ δ(AC ln(y − q1 − q2)α + ϕC(gˆ1, gˆ2))}. (33)
where AC = XC1 gˆ1+X
C
2 gˆ2+Y
C . For i, j = 1, 2, i = j, the ﬁrst-order condition
for i yields
qi = gi
y − qj
gi + αδAC
(34)
so that QCi (y, g1, g2) = ω
C
i y where
ωCi =
gi
gi + gj + αδAC
. (35)
Plugging QCi (y, gi, gj) = ω
C
i y, A
C = XC1 gˆ1+X
C
2 gˆ2+Y
C and (32) into (33)
yields the value function
V C(y, g1, g2) = (g1 + g2) ln y + g1 lnω
C
1 + g2 lnω
C
2
+ δα
(
XC1 gˆ1 +X
C
2 gˆ2 + Y
C
) (
ln y + ln(1− ωC1 − ωC2 )
)
+ δϕC(gˆ1, gˆ2), (36)
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which needs to agree with the conjecture as deﬁned by (32), i.e.,
XC1 g1 +X
C
2 g2 + Y
C = g1 + g2 + αδ
(
XC1 gˆ1 +X
C
2 gˆ2 + Y
C
)
(37)
and
ϕC(g1, g2) = g1 lnω
C
1 + g2 lnω
C
2 +
δα
(
XC1 gˆ1 +X
C
2 gˆ2 + Y
C
) (
ln(1− ωC1 − ωC2 )
)
+ δϕC(gˆ1, gˆ2).
(38)
Solving equation (37) for XC1 , X
C
2 and Y
C yields
XCi =
1
1− αδλi , (39)
Y C =
αδ
1− αδ
(
XSP1 θ1 +X
SP
2 θ2
)
=
αδ
1− αδ
(
θ1
1− αδλ1 +
θ2
1− αδθ1
)
, (40)
which, using (35) and the fact that AC = XC1 gˆ1 + X
C
2 gˆ2 + Y
C , yields (13)
and (14).
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